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D n a much celebrated September 1994address to the United Nations GeneralAssembly, American President Bill
Clinton challenged the international
community to concentrate its efforts
and move towards securing the global
elimination ofanti-personnel (AP)
mines. Just over three years later, in
December 1997, 122 countries
gathered in Canada to sign the Ottawa
Convention - formally titled the
Convention on the Prohibition ofthe
Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction. Despite widespread
international support from a variety of
states, international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations, the
United States opted not to sign the
most significant agreement negotiated
to date to eliminate AP mines. Why?
This essay will chronicle the evolving
AP mine position of the United States-
prior to, and particularly during the
Ottawa Process of October 1996 to
December 1997. The essay will review
the reluctance ofWashington to fully
participate in the Ottawa Process, the
decision to utilize the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) as the most appro-
priate forum for AP mine elimination
negotiations, and the announcement
that America would commit to
Convention negotiations in September
1997. Scrutiny will be paid to examin-
ing why the U.S. could not endorse the
final text of tlle negotiated Convention.
USAP MINE POLICY:
PRELUDE TO OTTAWA
Much effort to restrict AP mines,
albeit sporadic and less than fully
successful, had been spent by the inter-
national community - including the
United States - prior to the onset of the
Ottawa Process. The 10 October 1980
Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW) represented the first major
breakthrough in an attempt to address
the humanitarian horrors inflicted by
AP mines. Protocol II of the CCW -
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofMines, Booby-traps and Other
Devices - was by no means, however, a
definitive solution. Public and private
observers throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s - in the face ofongoing and
increased use ofAP mines and AP mine
accidents/deaths-found the 1980
Protocol to be increasingly ineffective.
The CCW, it was recognized, failed on
several counts including: the absence
ofadequate verification methods to
ensure state compliance and enforce
implementation; the absence of any
meaningful political, economic, or
military penalties to punish violators;
the inapplicability toward domestic
or intrastate conflict; the restrictive
focus on land mine use (as opposed
to production, stockpiling, transfer,
etc.); and the lack of an effective mech-
anism to guarantee ratification and
implementation.
Convinced that tougher measures
were required to combat the myriad of
problems stemming from AP mine use,
the international community recon-
vened in 1995 at the Review Conference
of the CCw. These meetings, held in
Vienna and Geneva from 25 Septem-
ber-13 October and also in January
1996 and 22 April-3 May 1996, culmi-
nated in a revamped Protocol II - yet
one that still failed to fully satisfY many
states, international organizations, and
non-governmental organizations alike.
This sense of frustration led eight like-
minded states (Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico,
Norway and Switzerland), the
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Shown above: PMA-2 Soviet-designed anti-personnel blast landmine. Photograph by
John Rodsted.
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
to examine and develop a new diplo-
matic path for the elimination ofAP
mines. These discussions, which began
on 19 January 1996, were ironically
attempting to identify an alternative AP
mine ban course of action, even as the
CCW Review Conference continued.
By the conclusion of the CCW Confer-
ence on 3 May 1996, Canada - arguably
the most determined state leading the
initiative for a more meaningful AP
mine ban agreement - declared its
intention to convene a multilateral
forum in the latter part of 1996. The
meeting would be designed to identify
and implement a plan of action to
meet this desired end.
For its part, the United States - which
had played an active role in crafting the
CCW Protocol revisions - was not yet
prepared to participate in, let alone
endorse, what would soon come to be
known as the Ottawa Process. In the
Spring of 1996, Washington was
instead engaged in an internal policy
review to determine the military use
of, and need for, AP mines. This review,
announced on 16 March 1996 and
ordered by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General John
Shalikashvili, culminated two months
later. The AP mine position of the
United States, as outlined by the
President, would include the following
components:
1) a renewed commitment to seeking
an international agreement to
eventually eliminate all AP mines;
2) a commitment to eliminate all
non self-detonatinglself-deacti-
vating (i.e., "dumb") AP mines
from the US. arsenal by 1999-
with the exception ofmore than
one million AP mines used to pro-
tectAmerican and South Korean
defense forces against a potential
military attack from North Korea;
3) a decision to continue the use of
self-detonatinglself-deactivating
(i.e., "smart") AP mines until such
time as effective alternatives were
designed to replace them or an
international AP mine elimination
accord was reached.
The summer of 1996 witnessed
no substantive changes to the newly
enunciated US. AP mine policy.
Washington's focus shifted to the ques-
tion of whether or not to participate at
the upcoming Canadian sponsored
international forum on eliminatingAP
mines, scheduled to be convened in
Ottawa. US. government officials met
with Canadian representatives on
several occasions to discuss the format,
scope, purpose and intended outcomes
of the Ottawa Conference. As one
Department ofState participant
involved in the talks put it
We were well aware that a number of
states - Canada, Austria, Norway and
the like - were dissatisfied with the CCW
Review outcome. The NGO community
was even more frustrated by the May
result. They viewed the upcoming
Ottawa meetings in a redemptive light...
as an opportunity to create afresh start
to rid mines from the world. Our concern
at this time was ensuring that any
declaration to emergefrom Ottawa be
non-binding on parties... A deadline
to eliminate mines by say 2000 was
from ourperspective wholly artificial
and inconsistent with past international
negotiations and with our security
commitments.
The US. ultimately agreed to attend
the 3-5 October Ottawa Conference,
titled "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines," as a full participant.
THE OTTAWA PROCESS &
THE POSITION OF THE
UNITED STATES
A. October 1996-August 1997: A
Different Road Taken
The position taken by the US. at the
Ottawa Conference was to underscore
the central features of its May 1996 AP
mine policy, while simultaneously
insisting that despite an ongoing com-
mitment to international negotiations
to eliminate AP mines, it was unwilling
to agree to any formal deadline. At the
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conclusion of the conference, some fifty
states, including the US., agreed to
support the Ottawa Declaration. The
declaration, essentially a statement
pledging political cooperation, notably
underscored the pressing need to
undertake "urgent action on the part of
the international community to ban
and eliminate [AP mines]," by commit-
ting states "to ensure the earliest possible
conclusion of a legaUy-bincling interna-
tional agreement to ban anti-personnel
mines." The terms and conditions out-
lined in the Ottawa Declaration were,
for all intents and purposes, consistent
with US. AP mine policy.
Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lloyd Axworthy, surprised the world,
however, when he announced on 5
October that it was Canada's intention
to convene an international AP mine
elimination treaty signingconference
in December 1997. This unilateral
decision was not greeted with raw
enthusiasm by the US. Karl Inderfurth,
Deputy US. ambassador to the UN.
and a member of the American delega-
tion offered the US. official response:
Shown above: POMZ Soviet-designedfragmentation anti-
personnellandmine. Photograph byJohn Rodsted.
Clearly all ofus attending this conference
feel strongly about the subject, and this
initiativeput on the table by the Cana-
dian Foreign Minister is one that we will
look at... We're notprepared to set a date,
but we are prepared to start work imme-
diately on an international agreement to
ban land mines.Ifthis can take place
within that timeframe and ifour con-
cerns can be met, we'll be very supportive.
Clearly disappointed and somewhat
frustrated by Canada's actions, Wash-
ington reviewed its options in the Fall
of 1996 for pursuing an international
AP mine ban. A commitment to full
participation in the newly launched
Ottawa Process option was dominated
by one overwhelming consideration:
could an international agreement be
negotiated that would effectively recog-
nize, incorporate, and reconcile itself to
America's existingAP mine platform?
Most observers in Washington believed
this unlikely, particularly given the
December 1997 deadline, but were not
yet prepared to completely abandon the
politically attractive Ottawa Process. An
alternate possibility available to the US.
was to seek international agreement
through the UN. sponsored Confer-
ence on Disarmament. The immediate
drawback to the CD process was obvi-
ous to all concerned - as an interna-
tional forum designed to address arms
control, disarmament, and elimination
issues, the CD utilized a consensual (as
opposed to a majority type) decision
making model. The probable net effect
of this institutional mechanism would
be to prolong the possibility of achiev-
ing an AP mine ban international
agreement. On the other hand, the CD
venue offered two attractive features
not contained in the Ottawa Process.
First, the Geneva-based Conference on
Disarmament included several states
whose signature and subsequent par-
ticipation would be required ifan AP
mine ban were, from Washington's per-
spective, to be truly effective. Several of
these actors, including Russia, China,
Iraq, North Korea, Syria and Israel were
not participants in, and indeed publicly
and privately dismissive of, the Ottawa
Process. The second and arguably more
compelling lure of the CD for the
United States was the belief that no
matter the time required, a final accord
would capture the political realities and
military necessities ofAmerica's AP
mine policy set forth in May 1996.
Washington's preferred option for
negotiating an international AP mine
ban was announced on 17 January
1997. Much to the consternation of
pro-Ottawa Process forces - which
included various states, international
organizations, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and Congressional support-
ers, most notably Senator Patrick Leahy
ofYermont - President Clinton stated
that the US. would commit its focus
and energies to the UN. Conference
on Disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament,
however, proved to be an exercise in
futility for the US. Despite repeated
attempts by American officials from
January-June 1997 to include the AP
mine elimination issue on the official
agenda proceedings at the CD, success
remained unattainable. Several con-
tributing factors effectively created
procedural roadblocks for the US.,
including continued support for the
use ofAP mines by some states, a
distinct preference, by certain states, to
address the AP mine issue through the
Ottawa Process, and an insistence by
other members that the CD needed to
first and foremost address the need for
international nuclear disarmament.
By June 1997 it was clear to Washing-
ton that the CD process would not bear
fruit. From early July to mid-August,
and in accordance with American AP
mine negotiation policy guidelines
established the previous January, the
US. policy community engaged in an
interagency review. The review was
structured to address two issues: the
lack of immediate progress and con-
comitant prospects for future success
at the CD; and, the status of the Ottawa
Process and whether, most importantly,
to commit to join negotiations in the
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Ottawa Process forum. The lack of
results at the CD, interagency review
officials noted, stood in sharp contrast
to the positive momentum of the
Ottawa Process. States, international
organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations were increasingly sup-
portive of this effort, and had success-
fully engaged in a series of constructive
AP mine elimination treaty-building
conferences throughout 1997. With the
completion of an initial draft treaty by
Austria, actors involved in the Ottawa
process met Ul Vienna (the 12-14
February Expert Meeting on the Text
of a Total Ban Convention), Bonn
(the 24-25 April Expert Meeting on
Compliance) and Brussels (the 24-27
June International Conference for a
Global Ban on Anti-Personnel MUles),
to examine the necessary conditions
and provisions to be contained in a
final treaty. The Brussels Conference,
ironically coinciding with the conclu-
sion of the CD, produced a political
declaration committing states - 97,
not including the U.S., signed the dec-
laration - to final negotiations in Oslo
in September and a subsequent treaty
signing conference scheduled for
December Ul Ottawa.
The key decision of the interagency
process - i.e., whether to participate in
the September negotiations - was
announced by President Clinton on
August 18. While still committed to the
CD as the forum of choice for seeking a
comprehensive international AP mine
ban treaty, the President acknowledged
that the U.S. would participate in the
Oslo negotiations. "The United States,"
Mr. Clinton observed, "will work with
the other participating nations to
secure an agreement that achieves our
humanitarian goals while protectulg
our national security interests." Despite
committing to Oslo, the position of the
United States entering negotiations was
clear: the U.S. would not be prepared to
sign the Ottawa Process treaty unless
significant modifications were made to




Immediately prior to the commence-
ment of negotiations on 1 September
at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on
an International Total Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines, the United States dis-
patched a delegation to Geneva to meet
with the Ottawa Process core group of
states. The purpose of the meeting,
requested by Washington, was to allow
U.S. officials the opportunity to outline
the negotiation positions that would
be pursued by the U.S. at Oslo, as well
as to express reservations about existing
draft treaty conditions and language.
Five issues were ofcentral concern
to Washington:
1) the need for stronger verification
procedures;
2) an exemption for continued AP
mine use in Korea;
3) the right to continue to use anti-
tank mines;
4) a suitable transition period for
treaty compliance;
5) conditions governing the rights of
states to withdraw from the treaty.
The first two weeks of the Oslo
Conference witnessed repeated efforts
by the U.S., in plenary sessions and
smaller working group venues, to enlist
support for its negotiation platform.
Apart from the limited support offered
by the United Kingdom, Australia,
Japan, Poland, Spain and Ecuador for
specific U.S. proposals, no progress was
immediately discernible - except on the
issue ofverification. On this latter issue,
the United States was able to generate
broad-based support for a revised
verification and compliance measure
regitne. Concerns abounded, however,
on the American request for a Korean
exemption. Most states, international
organizations and non-governmental
organizations rejected this demand
outright, convinced that the granting
of an exemption would lead other
states to possibly demand similar
considerations, thereby weakening the
overall impact of the treaty. Many also
believed that there was little to no mili-
tary utility for AP mines in the case of
Korea, and that suitable technological
and strategic alternatives were available
to the U.S.. Attempts to classify smart
mjnes and anti-handling devices
attached to anti-tank and anti-vehicle
mines as submunitions and not as AP
mines were equally fruitless. A subse-
quent decision by U.S. negotiators to
re-categorize these forces as anti-han-
dling devices as opposed to submuni-
tions met with the same negative result.
A nine year transitional delay of entry-
into-force for the treaty was likewise
rejected by the overwhelming majority
of states. American claulls that an ade-
quate transition period was necessary
to develop, test, and integrate new mili-
tary instruments to replace AP nlines
fell on deaf ears. Finally, the U.S posi-
tion on treaty withdrawal- a 90 day
notification period and the right of
withdrawal if a state should be engaged
in war - was not widely supported.
Confronted with the uncomforting
realities of Oslo, the United States next
opted to pursue two related avenues: it
decided to reformulate its negotiation
platform; and, to seek international
support - spearheaded through tlle
direct diplomatic intervention and
efforts of President Clinton - for the
new U.S. position. The re-configured
American platform, which would be
presented on 16 September at the Oslo
Conference, no longer contained an
exemption for Korea and instead
focused on three issues:
1) a redefinition ofanti-handling
devices so as to permit the use of
such weapons not physically
attached but near anti-tank mines;
2) tlle right, for nine years, to defer
compliance with specific treaty
conditions; and,
3) the right to withdraw from the
treaty if a state determined that
it was, in keeping with the stan-
dards set forth in the United
Nations Charter, a victim of
armed aggression.
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To win support for this package of
proposals, President Clinton personally
spoke with several political leaders,
including Canadian Prime Minister
Jean Chretien, South African President
Nelson Mandela and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair.
In an attempt to gain converts for the
revised U.S. platform, the American
delegation at Oslo - upon presenting
its new negotiation positions on 16
September - requested, and was given,
a twenty-four hour extension. The
reconsideration - i.e., international
accommodation ofAmerican AP mine
interests - that Washington sought
never materialized, and on 17
September the United States officially
withdrew from the negotiations. The
following day, the plenary session of
the Oslo Conference formally voted to
adopt the treaty.
In disclosing that the U.S. would not
sign the Ottawa Treaty, President
Clinton announced a series of acceler-
ated national AP mine elimination and
global demining initiatives. First, the
President established a target date for
eliminating the use ofAP mines by the
United States. The Department of
Defense was instructed to "develop
alternatives to antipersonnel mines"
by 2003, and in the case ofKorea, by the
year 2006. Additional research funding
would be made available to accomplish
this objective. Second, David Jones,
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
ofStaff, was appointed as special advi-
sor on AP mine issues to the President
and Secretary of Defense William
Cohen. Third, a significant increase in
U.S. funded and operated demining
programs was set into motion.
Angolan women maimed by landmines.
C: September 1997 and Beyond
The final months of 1997 witnessed no
fundamental shift in U.S. AP mine pol-
icy. Determined to once again proceed
with AP mine elimination efforts at the
Conference on Disarmament, the
United States did not move - as some
observers wishfully anticipated - to
endorse the Ottawa Convention. The
most notable development in U.S
policy during this period was in the
area of demining. On 31 October,
Secretary ofState Albright announced
the "Demining 2010" proposal, billed as
"a major new United States initiative on
a subject of widespread concern."
Highlighted by the appointment of
Karl Inderfurth to the new positions of
Special Representative of the President
and Secretary ofState for Global
Humanitarian Demining, this program
was established to rapidly facilitate
global demining efforts, with an aim of
achieving complete AP deployed mine
elimination by 2010.
The Ottawa Convention signatory
conference of2-4 December 1997-
formally titled ''A Global Ban on
Landmines: Treaty Signing Conference
and Mine Action Forum" - was
attended by an American observer dele-
gation headed by Secretary Inderfurth.
Amid the effusively celebratory atmos-
phere, Inderfurth noted that "Canada
had done a remarkable and important
United Nations Photo
. thing in trying to get the countries
of the world to agree not to produce,
deploy or sell landmines," but none-
theless reminded conference attendees
that, the United States did not sign this
treaty. This is because ofPresident
Clinton's concern for the safety and secu-
rity ofour men and women in uniform
and the unique responsibilities the
United States has around the worldfor
the security offriends and allies, notfor
lack ofdedication to our common goal of
eliminating anti-personnel mines from
theface ofthe earth.
As we approach July 2000, some 137
nations have signed the Convention,
with 94 signatories also having ratified
the text. Official American policy is
to be AP mine free by the year 2006,
thereby allowing the U.S. to sign the
Convention. Much work remains,
however, if this target date is to be met.
Christopher Kirkey is Associate Professor
ofPolitical Science and Canadian Mine
Action Scholar-in-Residence at the
Canadian Consulate General in Boston.
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